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Introduction
Just when many thought the United States Supreme Court's
prayer-in-school dilemma was over, the subject came back to haunt
them. This time, however, the dispute did not concern prayers in the
classroom. Rather, the Court examined an area it had never before
addressed: the constitutionality of public school graduation prayers.
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment states: "Con-
gress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion."'
Although the Court interpreted this phrase strictly in Everson v.
Board of Education,2 since then, the Court has broadened its effect in
analyzing Establishment Clause cases. Some commentators3 believed
that Lee v. Weisman4 would reaffirm this trend towards religious ac-
commodation and "revive the interaction between religion and gov-
ernment for the next several decades." 5 The Court declared, however,
that prayers delivered as part of a graduation ceremony in a public
school violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.6
This holding was surprising for at least two reasons. First, the opinion
was delivered by Justice Kennedy, whose recent opinion in County of
Allegheny v. ACLU7 had suggested that he would join the dissenters
in Lee. Second, Justice Kennedy's opinion ignored the test of Lemon
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I. These prohibitions are applicable to state action abridging
religious freedom under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. Cantwell v. Con-
necticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
2. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Everson addressed the constitutionality of a program that au-
thorized reimbursement to parents for costs associated with transporting their children to
school on public buses. Many of the students attended Roman Catholic schools. Although
the program was upheld, the Court used strong language in defining what the Establish-
ment Clause was intended to prohibit:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over an-
other. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or remain away from
church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any reli-
gion .... In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by
law was intended to "erect a wall of separation between church and State."
Id. at 15-16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)).
3. See Ralph D. Mawdsley & Charles J. Russo, High School Prayers at Graduation:
Will the Supreme Court Pronounce the Benediction?, 69 EDuc. L. REP. 189, 201 (1991);
Timothy V. Franklin, Squeezing The Juice Out Of The Lemon Test, 72 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 16-
17 (1992). See also Joseph L. Conn, Courtroom Contender: Pat Robertson Escalates His
Courtroom Campaign, CHURCH & STATE, June 1992, at 4, 5 (noting that Pat Robertson, a
religious broadcaster, was quoted as saying that Lee v. Weisman will be a "stunning defeat
for the ACLU and its left-wing allies."). Id.
4. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
5. Mawdsley & Russo, supra note 3, at 202.
6. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2661.
7. 492 U.S. 573, 655 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
v. Kurtzman,' which the Court had used in all public school prayer
cases since 1971.
Part I of this Comment examines the history of the Establishment
Clause, beginning with the first case involving prayer in public
schools. A thorough discussion of Lee v. Weisman follows in Part II,
with a detailed analysis of Justice Kennedy's majority opinion, the
concurring opinions, and the dissent. Part III criticizes the Court's
method of analysis as unsupported by precedent and unpersuasive in
reason. By inventing a new coercion test without clarifying the status
of Lemon, the Court has left the law in a state of confusion. Since the
Court refused to overrule Lemon in Lee, it should have respected the
principle of stare decisis and applied the Lemon test in that case. Ac-
cordingly, an analysis of the facts of Lee under the Lemon test follows.
Finally, the legal ramifications of the Lee decision as well as some
alternatives to the graduation prayer dilemma are examined in Part
IV.
I. Background
In 1962, Engel v. Vitale9 became the first case to consider the con-
stitutionality of prayer in public schools. In Engel, a New York school
district, acting under state law, directed a school principal to have stu-
dents recite a daily prayer in public school classrooms.' 0 New York
state officials composed the prayer, and suggested that it be published
as part of their "Statement on Moral and Spiritual Training in the
Schools."'" Parents of some schoolchildren challenged the constitu-
tionality of the New York law authorizing the district to direct the use
of the prayer, as well as the district's regulation of the particular
prayer to be recited.'2
The Supreme Court held that New York state laws condoning the
use of this prayer violated the Establishment Clause because the
prayer was drafted by state officials with the goal of advancing reli-
gious beliefs. 3 The Court stated that the prohibition against laws re-
specting an establishment of religion "must at least mean that in this
country it is no part of the business of government to compose official
prayers for any group of the American people to recite as a part of a
religious program carried on by government."' 4 School officials had
argued that the prayers were nondenominational and that the state
8. 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
9. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 423.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 425.
14. Id.
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program permitted students to remain silent or leave the room.15 The
Court felt that this did not cure the statute's constitutional defects. 6
A year later, in Abington School District v. Schempp,'7 the Court
fashioned a test to evaluate Establishment Clause cases. 8 The test
asked, "[W]hat are [sic] the purpose and the primary effect of the en-
actment? If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then
the enactment exceeds the scope of the legislative power as circum-
scribed by the Constitution."' 9 Applying this test, the Court held that
a state may not require Bible readings or the recitation of the Lord's
prayer in public schools, whether or not participation is mandatory."
The test in Abington became part of a three-prong analysis the
Court later developed to evaluate Establishment Clause cases. The
Court announced this test, popularly known as the Lemon test, in
Lemon v. Kurtzman.2' In order for a statute to survive an Establish-
ment Clause challenge: 1) it "must have a secular legislative purpose";
2) "its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances
nor inhibits religion"; and 3) "the statute must not foster 'an excessive
government entanglement with religion.'"22
In Lemon, the Court evaluated the constitutionality of two state
statutes authorizing government aid to private schools.' One statute
allowed private school teachers to receive salary supplements as long
as they taught courses offered in public schools and refrained from
teaching religion.2 4 The second statute permitted private schools to
be reimbursed for various expenditures related to providing educa-
tional services to students.25 Again, reimbursement was limited to
those expenditures associated with secular subjects.26
Although the statutes were meant to improve private school edu-
cation and had no aims of promoting religion, Roman Catholic
schools were the primary beneficiaries. The Court feared that govern-
15. Id. at 430. The prayer in question read as follows: "Almighty God, we acknowl-
edge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our
teachers and our Country." Id. at 422.
16. Id. at 430.
17. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
18. Id. at 222.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 223-25.
21. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
22. Id. at 612-13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)). The entan-
glement prong was first introduced in Walz, where the Court upheld the granting of tax
exemptions to religious organizations for property used for religious worship. 397 U.S. at
676-80.
23. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 606.
24. Id. at 607-09.
25. Id. at 609-10.
26. Id.
ment, in monitoring compliance with the statutes' conditions, would
become too entangled with religion.27 Consequently, the Court found
that both statutes violated the Establishment Clause 28
The Lemon test was cited with approval over ten years later in
Lynch v. Donnelly.29 In Lynch, the Court upheld the inclusion of a
cr6che as part of a city's Christmas display. The Court found that
under Lemon, there was a secular purpose for including the cr6che,
the city did not impermissibly advance religion, and the presence of
the cr6che did not result in excessive entanglement between religion
and government.30 Although the Court in Lynch relied entirely on
the Lemon analysis in upholding the city's display, the Court indicated
an unwillingness to restrict itself to one single test in the delicate area
of Establishment Clause jurisprudence.31
Justice O'Connor developed a less stringent analytical framework
for analyzing Establishment Clause cases in her concurrence in Lynch.
Justice O'Connor's "endorsement test" focused on government en-
dorsement or disapproval of religion.32 According to Justice
O'Connor, including the cr6che as part of the larger display was a
"celebration of the public holiday through its traditional symbols. '33
Thus, the city neither endorsed Christianity nor disapproved of non-
Christian religion. 4
The Court again applied the Lemon test in Wallace v. Jaffree,35
which held unconstitutional an Alabama statute authorizing a period
of silence "for meditation or voluntary prayer" 36 in all public
schools.3 7 The Court found that the government's purpose in enacting
the statute was to endorse religion, 8 giving much weight to the fact
that Alabama already had a statute authorizing a one-minute period
27. Id. at 614-22.
28. Id. at 624-25.
29. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
30. Id. at 685-87.
31. Id. at 678-80. "The Establishment Clause like the Due Process Clauses is not a
precise, detailed provision in a legal code capable of ready application.... The line be-
tween permissible relationships and those barred by the Clause can no more be straight
and unwavering than due process can be defined in a single stroke or phrase or test.... In
the line-drawing process we have often found it useful to inquire whether the challenged
law or conduct has a secular purpose, whether its principal or primary effect is to advance
or inhibit religion, and whether it creates an excessive entanglement of government with
religion. But, we have repeatedly emphasized our unwillingness to be confined to any
single test or criterion in this sensitive area." Id. (citations omitted).
32. Id. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
33. Id. at 691.
34. Id. at 692.
35. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
36. Ala. Code § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984).
37. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 48.
38. Id. at 56.
Winter 19941 LEE v. WEISMAN
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of silence for meditation. 9 In addition, the Court noted that Senator
Donald Holmes had admitted that the legislation was targeted at re-
storing voluntary prayer to the public schools.
40
The next major Establishment Clause case to reach the Supreme
Court was County of Allegheny v. ACLU.4 1 In Allegheny, the Court
held that the display of a cr6che on a staircase of the county court-
house violated the Establishment Clause, but the display of a menorah
next to a forty-five-foot decorated Christmas tree did not.42 The
Court noted that, unlike the cr6che in Lynch, which was surrounded
by other Christmas decorations, the cr6che on the staircase in Alle-
gheny stood alone. This, the Court thought, sent a message that the
county supported the Christian praise to God above that of the Jewish
faith.43 Because the menorah stood next to the tree, however, there
was neither endorsement nor disapproval of one particular faith.'
H. Lee v. Weisman
A. Factual Background
In June of 1989, Deborah Weisman graduated from Nathan
Bishop Middle School, a public school in Providence, Rhode Island.45
For years, the Providence School Committee and Superintendent of
Schools had a policy of permitting their principals to invite clergy
members to give invocations and benedictions at middle and high
school graduations.46 In keeping with this tradition, the school princi-
pal, Robert E. Lee, invited Rabbi Leslie Gutterman of Temple Beth
El to deliver the prayers at Deborah's graduation.47 The principal
gave Rabbi Gutterman a pamphlet entitled "Guidelines for Civic Oc-
casions."48 It was customary for Providence school officials to provide
invited clergy with this pamphlet, which was prepared by the National
Conference of Christians and Jews.49 Along with the pamphlet, Rabbi
Gutterman was advised that the invocation and benediction should be
39. Id. at 58-60.
40. Id. at 56-57.
41. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
42. Id. at 621.
43. Id. at 598-601.
44. Id. at 613-21. Although the Allegheny Court discussed the Lemon principles, it
seemed to be focusing its analysis in terms of whether the challenged government action
endorsed religious beliefs. Id.





nonsectarian. Rabbi Gutterman's prayers were brief, lasting only a
few minutes. °
Before the graduation, Deborah and her father sought a tempo-
rary restraining order in the District Court of Rhode Island to prevent
the school from including the prayers in the ceremony.51 Because the
court did not have adequate time to consider the constitutionality of
the proposed prayers, it denied their request.52 Deborah and her fa-
ther attended the graduation, which was held on the premises of Na-
than Bishop Middle School. Following the graduation, Mr. Weisman
and Deborah amended their complaint to seek a permanent injunc-
tion barring Providence school officials from sponsoring prayers at fu-
ture graduations. 3
50. Rabbi Gutterman's prayers were as follows:
INVOCATION
God of the Free, Hope of the Brave: For the legacy of America where diver-
sity is celebrated and the rights of minorities are protected, we thank You. May
these young men and women grow up to enrich it.
For the liberty of America, we thank You. May these new graduates grow up
to guard it.
For the political process of America in which all its citizens may participate,
for its court system where all may seek justice we thank You. May those we
honor this morning always turn to it in trust.
For the destiny of America we thank You. May the graduates of Nathan
Bishop Middle School so live that they might help to share it.
May our aspirations for our country and for these young people, who are our
hope for the future, be richly fulfilled. AMEN.
BENEDICTION
0 God, we are grateful to You for having endowed us with the capacity for
learning which we have celebrated on this joyous commencement.
Happy families give thanks for seeing their children achieve an important
milestone. Send Your blessings upon the teachers and administrators who helped
prepare them.
The graduates now need strength and guidance for the future, help them to
understand that we are not complete with academic knowledge alone. We must
each strive to fulfill what You require of us all: To do justly, to love mercy, to walk
humbly. We give thanks to You, Lord, for keeping us alive, sustaining us and
allowing us to reach this special, happy occasion. AMEN.
Id. at 2652-53.
51. Id. at 2653-54.
52. Id. at 2654. It is not unusual for a court to grant a preliminary injunction prohibit-
ing graduation prayers shortly prior to the ceremony when there is a clear Establishment
Clause violation. See, e.g., Bennett v. Livermore Unified Sch. Dist., 193 Cal. App. 3d 1012
(1987); Graham v. Central Community Sch. Dist., 608 F. Supp. 531 (S.D. Iowa 1985).
53. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2654. At the time the complaint was amended, Deborah Weis-
man was a student at Classical High School in Providence, Rhode Island, and it was highly
likely that an invocation and benediction would be given at her high school graduation.
Consequently, the issues were not moot and Mr. Weisman and Deborah had standing to
seek the injunction. Id.
Winter 19941 LEE v. WEISMAN
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The district court granted the permanent injunction.54 The First
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision.55
School officials filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme
Court of the United States.56
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals.5" Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Justices Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, and Souter joined. Justices
Blackmun and Souter filed concurring opinions; Justices Stevens and
O'Connor joined both concurring opinions. Justice Scalia filed a dis-




Early in the opinion, the majority stated its intention to decide
the case without invoking the Lemon test when it declared, "This case
does not require us to revisit the difficult questions dividing us in re-
cent cases, questions of the definition and full scope of the principles
governing the extent of permitted accommodation by the State for the
religious beliefs and practices of many of its citizens. '59 Rather than
using the Lemon test, the Court held the challenged graduation prayer
unconstitutional because it violated the central principle that "govern-
ment may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its
"160exercise ....
54. Weisman v. Lee, 728 F. Supp. 68 (D. R.I. 1990). The court applied the three-
pronged test of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), and found that the practice of the
Providence School Committee violated the second prong of the test.
[T]he practice of having a benediction and invocation delivered at public school
graduation ceremonies has the effect of advancing religion. The special occasion
of graduation coupled with the presence of prayer creates an identification of
governmental power with religious practice. Finally, the practice of including
prayer may have the effect of either endorsing one religion over others, or of
endorsing religion in general. For these reasons, the practice of providing guide-
lines for "non-sectarian" prayer fails to withstand constitutional scrutiny.
Weisman, 728 F. Supp. at 71-73.
55. Weisman v. Lee, 908 F.2d. 1090 (1st Cir. 1990). Writing for the majority, Judge
Torruella agreed with the district court without any elaboration. Id. In his concurrence,
Judge Bownes went beyond the district court's conclusions and found that the prayer vio-
lated all three prongs of the Lemon Test. Id. at 1094-95 (Bownes, J., concurring).
56. Lee v. Weisman, 499 U.S. 918 (1991).
57. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 2655. The majority cited various cases in support of this statement: County
of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
60. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2655.
The majority listed several reasons why the State's involvement
in the graduation prayer was problematic. First, school officials
elected to include a prayer in the graduation ceremony.6 1 Second, the
principal selected a rabbi to lead the prayers.62 These decisions were
easily traceable to the State. Finally, the principal furnished Rabbi
Gutterman with the "Guidelines for Civic Occasions" pamphlet and
instructed him to keep the prayers nonsectarian.63 Thus, the principal
"directed and controlled the content of the prayer."'
Although school officials attempted to keep the graduation
prayers nonsectarian, the majority refused to give this any weight in
its analysis. According to the majority, the question was not whether
the school tried to make the prayer acceptable to the general audi-
ence, but whether the school could properly conduct a religious exer-
cise which students must attend. The majority felt that the students
would perceive the efforts of the school officials to monitor the prayer
as an inducement to participate in activities they might otherwise
reject.66
The majority rejected the argument that the formal prayer cere-
mony was a form of protected speech that should be tolerated just as
certain ideas that may be offensive to some students must be tolerated
in the classroom.67 The First Amendment protects speech by guarding
its absolute expression, even when the government is a participant. 8
Freedom of religion, on the other hand, is protected by eliminating
governmental participation. As the majority stated in Lee, the Estab-
lishment Clause is a "specific prohibition" on state intervention in
religious affairs. 9
The majority also addressed "heightened concerns with protect-
ing freedom of conscience from subtle coercive pressure" in the public
school setting.70 Previous decisions recognized that prayer exercises
in public schools carry a "particular risk of indirect coercion."'7 ' To a
believer, asking a nonbeliever to sit through a religious exercise might
seem nothing more than a request that the nonbeliever respect a reli-
gious practice. In the school context, however, this request could ap-
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 2656.
64. Id.
65. Id.




70. Id. at 2658.
71. Id. (citing Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) and Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962)).
Winter 1994] LEE v. WEISMAN
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pear to be "an attempt to employ the machinery of the State to
enforce a religious orthodoxy."7 2
The majority paid special attention to the peer pressure inherent
in the graduation ceremony. It likened the subtle and indirect pres-
sures of standing with the group or remaining silent during the prayers
to overt compulsion.73 Many of the students, the majority stated,
viewed standing or remaining silent as an "expression of participa-
tion" in Rabbi Gutterman's prayers.74 The Court did not address
whether this analysis would apply to "mature adults."'75 However, the
Court appeared convinced that adolescents attending the graduation
would be susceptible to the pressures of conforming.76
The majority refused to find that the rabbi's prayers were of a de
minimis character because "[t]o do so would be an affront to the
Rabbi who offered them and to all those for whom the prayers were
an essential and profound recognition of divine authority."77 Simi-
larly, the majority rejected the argument "that the option of not at-
tending the graduation excuses any inducement or coercion in the
ceremony itself.... Law reaches past formalism. And to say a teen-
age student has a real choice not to attend her high school graduation
is formalistic in the extreme."7 " In this society, the majority noted,
high school graduation is a significant occasion. Although attendance
is voluntary, "it is apparent that a student is not free to absent herself
from the graduation exercises in any real sense of the term 'volun-
tary,' for absence would require forfeiture of those intangible benefits
which have motivated the student through youth and all her high
school years."7 9
Finally, the majority distinguished Marsh v. Chambers,80 which




75. See infra notes 177-80 and accompanying text.
76. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2658-59 (citing Clay V. Brittain, Adolescent Choices and Parent-
Peer Cross-Pressures, 28 AM. Soc. REv. 385,390 (1963); Donna Rae Clasen & B. Bradford
Brown, The Multidimensionality of Peer Pressure in Adolescence, 14 J. OF YoUTH AM
ADOLESCENCE 451, 464 (1985); Donna Rae Clasen, et al., Perceptions of Peer Pressure,
Peer Conformity Dispositions, and Self-Reported Behavior Among Adolescents, 22 DEVEL-
OPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 521, 528 (1986)).
77. Id. at 2659.
78. Id.
79. Id. Later in the opinion, the Court cited Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 224-25 (1963), and Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962), to refute the argument
that voluntary attendance at the graduation ceremony frees the prayers from constitutional
attack. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2660. Even though the students in Engel and Schempp could be
excused from the daily prayers, the Court nonetheless found the practice to violate the
Establishment Clause. Id.
80. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
prayer.81 It listed a number of critical differences between the public
school system and a session of a state legislature. First, at the opening
of a session of a state legislature, "adults are free to enter and leave
with little comment... ."I This, the majority explained, is unlike the
"constraining potential" of a graduation ceremony.8 3 During a high
school graduation, the students and ceremony remain under the firm
control of teachers and school officials. This degree of control makes
the prayer at graduation a "state-sanctioned religious exercise in
which student[s are] left with no alternative but to submit."'
In sum, the majority opinion stated that the key question was
whether students were compelled to participate in a religious exer-
cise." Answering this question in the affirmative, the Court declared
that the graduation prayers at Nathan Bishop Middle School violated
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 6
2. The Concurring Opinions:
a. Justice Blackmun
According to Justice Blackmun, although coercion is not required
for an Establishment Clause violation, it is sufficient, and the gradua-
tion prayer violated the Establishment Clause because it pressured
students to participate in a religious exercise. He began his concur-
ring opinion with the broad statement that "[g]overnment may neither
promote nor affiliate itself with any religious doctrine or organization,
nor may it obtrude itself in the internal affairs of any religious institu-
tion."'87 He cited with approval the words of Thomas Jefferson that
the clause against the establishment of religion "was intended to erect
'a wall of separation between church and State."'8 8 In addition, Jus-
tice Blackmun cited Engel and Schempp as authority for his position. 9
Although the prayer in Engel was nondenominational and the stu-
dents were not compelled to participate, the Engel Court nonetheless
found the Establishment Clause was violated.90 Likewise, the
Schempp Court found the exercise of reading prayers at the beginning
of each school morning a violation of the Establishment Clause.91
81. Id. at 795.
82. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2660.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 2661.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 2661-62 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
88. Id. at 2662 (quoting Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947)).
89. Id. at 2662-63.
90. Id. at 2663.
91. Id.
Winter 19941 LEE V. WOIMAN
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Unlike the majority, Justice Blackmun reviewed the graduation
prayer question under the principles of the Lemon test.92 He felt
compelled to apply Lemon because the Court had vigorously applied
the Lemon factors in every case involving religious activities in public
schools since 1971.93 Although Justice Blackmun did not analyze the
prayer separately under each prong of Lemon, he noted that the
rabbi's prayer, which asked for God's blessings, was unquestionably
religious. This acknowledgement of divine faith, according to Justice
Blackmun, is precisely the type of activity that Lemon was designed to
prohibit.94
Concluding his analysis under Lemon, Justice Blackmun stated
the question simply as whether the government had "'plac[ed] its offi-
cial stamp of approval"' on the prayer.95 He then answered his own
question as follows:
[W]hen the government "compose[s] official prayers," selects
the member of the clergy to deliver the prayer, has the prayer
delivered at a public school event that is planned, supervised
and given by school officials, and pressures students to attend
and participate in the prayer, there can be no doubt that the
government is advancing and promoting religion.
96
Justice Blackmun further stated that government is not merely forbid-
den from coercing religious practices. Rather, government may not
involve itself in any way with religion. 7 Although coercion is suffi-
cient proof of a violation of the Establishment Clause, it is not a nec-
essary element.98 "The mixing of government and religion can be a
threat to free government, even if no one is forced to participate." 99
Justice Blackmun concluded by observing that religion is
strengthened without the aid and sponsorship of government. In or-
der to make as much room as possible for the expression of different
beliefs and creeds, he noted, government must not side with any par-
ticular faith.10
92. Id. at 2663-64.
93. Id. at 2663 n.4.
94. Id. at 2664.
95. Id. (quoting Engel, 370 U.S. at 429).
96. Id. (citations omitted). Justice Blackmun supported this conclusion in a footnote,
stating that the phrase in the benediction, "We must each strive to fulfill what you require
of us all, to do justly, to love mercy, to walk humbly," was taken from the Book of the
Prophet Micah. This, he said, promotes the Judeo-Christian message. Id. at 2665 n.5.
97. Id. at 2664.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 2665.
100. Id.
b. Justice Souter
Justice Souter agreed with the majority's coercion analysis, but
wrote separately to clarify whether the Establishment Clause applies
to government activity that does not favor one religion over others.
He also considered whether coercion, as opposed to mere endorse-
ment, is a required element for an Establishment Clause violation. 10 1
He began his discussion with a quote from Everson v. Board of
Education."° The Establishment Clause forbids government action
that "'aid[s] one religion... or prefer[s] one religion over another"'
and action that "'aid[s] all religions.""' 3 Justice Souter acknowl-
edged, however, that there have been challenges to this precedent.'
°4
Some have argued that nonpreferential government aid to religion is
permitted under the Establishment Clause. 05 For example, in a dis-
sent from Wallace v. Jaffree, 06 Justice Rehnquist wrote that "'[t]he
Establishment Clause did not require government neutrality between
religion and irreligion nor did it prohibit the Federal Government
from providing nondiscriminatory aid to religion."°107 Justice Souter
found no support for Justice Rehnquist's position, however, when
viewed in light of the Establishment Clause's textual development. 0 8
Justice Souter traced this textual development, which began with
one of James Madison's proposals to amend the Constitution to pro-
tect religious freedom.10 9 Madison's proposal, however, did not pre-
vail and after various changes by the House and Senate, the current
version of the First Amendment was finally passed.1 0 Justice Souter
relied heavily on the fact that, unlike previous drafts, the final lan-
guage of the First Amendment is not limited to laws respecting an
establishment of "a religion," "a national religion," "one religious
sect," or "specific articles of faith.""' Instead, Justice Souter claimed,
the amendment's language is broader and prohibits state support for
religion in general.11
2
101. Id. at 2667 (Souter, J., concurring).
102. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
103. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2667 (quoting Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947)).
104. I at 2668.
105. Id. at 2668-70.
106. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
107. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2668 (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 106 (1985) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting)).
108. Id.
109. Id The original language of the religion clause read: "'[tihe civil rights of none
shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion
be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any
pretext, infringed."' Id. (quoting 1 ANNALs OF CONG. 434 (1789)).
110. Id. at 2669-70.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 2669.
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To further strengthen his view, Justice Souter explained that
while nonpreferentialists would prohibit sectarian religious practices,
ecumenical religious practices would be acceptable. 13 Thus, under a
nonpreferentialist interpretation, an Establishment Clause challenge
would require the Court to investigate the specific religious practice at
issue. This, Justice Souter claimed, would be impermissible because it
would "invite the courts to engage in comparative theology." 4 In
sum, Justice Souter stressed that the Establishment Clause applies
even to government activities that do not favor one religion over
another.
Justice Souter next discussed whether coercion is a necessary ele-
ment for an Establishment Clause violation. He began this segment
of his analysis with a review of the many United States Supreme
Court cases that invalidated noncoercive state laws and practices. For
example, in County of Allegheny v. ACL U,115 despite the Court's find-
ing that the cr6che did not coerce anyone into accepting a particular
religious belief, a majority held that the display nonetheless unconsti-
tutionally endorsed Christian beliefs."16 According to Justice Souter,
precedent cannot support the view that coercion is a necessary ele-
ment for an Establishment Clause violation."7
Justice Souter further examined the prevailing circumstances
under which the Establishment Clause was framed. He acknowledged
that while the religion clauses were adopted in response to wide-
spread state-coerced religious practices, coercion alone did not ac-
count for the Framers' hostility. Both Jefferson and Madison opposed
any political appropriation of religion." 8 For example, Jefferson re-
fused to issue Thanksgiving Proclamations because he felt they vio-
lated the religion clauses. 1 9 Likewise, during his first three years in
office, Madison would not call for days of thanksgiving and prayer. 2
Although Justice Souter acknowledged that the First Congress may
113. Id. at 2671.
114. Id.
115. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
116. Id. at 589-94, 598-602. See also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (striking
down moment-of-silence statute not because the statute coerced students to pray, but be-
cause its existence conveyed a message that the State approved of prayers in public class-
rooms); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (striking down state law barring the
teaching of Darwin's theory of evolution not because the statute coerced people to support
religion, but because the statute was enacted purely for a religious purpose).
117. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2672.
118. Id. at 2673-74.
119. Id. at 2674.
120. Id. at 2675. During the War of 1812, Madison called four times for days of
thanksgiving and prayer. Justice Souter, however, noted that Madison's inability to stick to
his own convictions in times of political pressure did not erase his convictions. Id.
have engaged in practices contrary to the separationists' views,'12 this
only showed that the Framers lacked a common understanding of the
Establishment Clause.
Finally, Justice Souter discussed the concept of neutrality embed-
ded in the Establishment Clause."2 He noted that although the gov-
ernment must remain neutral in matters of religion, state
accommodation of free exercise of religion is not prohibited." How-
ever, there is one requirement: "accommodation must lift a discerni-
ble burden on the free exercise of religion.' 124  In light of the
foregoing, Justice Souter stated that the graduation prayers were an
unconstitutional establishment of religion. Nobody, according to Jus-
tice Souter, could realistically argue that eliminating the prayer would
burden an individual's free exercise of religion.'25
3. The Dissent: Justice Scalia
Justice Scalia, in a strongly worded dissent, focused on history
and tradition. He began his opinion with a quote from Justice Ken-
nedy's opinion in County of Allegheny v. ACLU.' 26 "'[G]overnment
policies of accommodation, acknowledgment, and support for religion
[are] an accepted part of our political and cultural heritage.' "127 Jus-
tice Scalia further wrote that prohibiting invocations and benedictions
at public school graduation ceremonies "lays waste a tradition that is
as old as public-school graduation ceremonies themselves ....1,128
Justice Scalia acknowledged that the existence of a practice in our
nation's heritage is not conclusive evidence of its constitutionality.
29
121. Id. (citing Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 788 (1983)).
122. Id at 2676-78.
123. Id. at 2676.
124. Id. at 2677.
125. As an alternative, Justice Souter stated that individuals wishing to express their
religious feelings could do so either before or after the ceremony. For example, nothing in
the Establishment Clause would prohibit a group of individuals from organizing a privately
sponsored baccalaureate. Id at 2677-78.
126. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
127. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2678 (quoting Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 657). As the following
excerpt from his opinion demonstrates, Justice Kennedy's tone was quite strong in
Allegheny:
Rather than requiring government to avoid any action that acknowledges or aids
religion, the Establishment Clause permits government some latitude in recogniz-
ing and accommodating the central role religion plays in our society. Any ap-
proach less sensitive to our heritage would border on latent hostility toward
religion, as it would require government in all its multifaceted roles to acknowl-
edge only the secular, to the exclusion and so to the detriment of the religious.
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 657 (citations omitted).
128. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2679 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
129. Id. (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York City, 397 U.S. 664, 681 (1970) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring)).
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He claimed, however, that tradition should be a significant considera-
tion when interpreting the Establishment Clause.130 Justice Scalia
stated the necessity of inquiring into the history of prayers and he
noted those in the inaugural addresses of George Washington,' 3'
Thomas Jefferson,'132 James Madison,'133 and George Bush.' 34 Justice
Scalia continued his historical examination with references to the tra-
dition of Thanksgiving Proclamations and the legislative session
prayers accepted in Marsh v. Chambers.'3 Justice Scalia concluded
this segment of his dissent with a reminder that the United States
Supreme Court opens its sessions with the invocation, "God save the
United States and this Honorable Court.'1 36 In abandoning this long-
standing American tradition of nonsectarian prayers at public celebra-
tions, Justice Scalia claimed that the Court "invent[ed] a boundless,
and boundlessly manipulable, test of psychological coercion ......
130. 1d
131. As part of his first official act, President Washington made the following prayer:.
[I]t would be peculiarly improper to omit in this first official act my fervent sup-
plications to that Almighty Being who rules over the universe, who presides in the
councils of nations, and whose providential aids can supply every human defect,
that His benediction may consecrate to the liberties and happiness of the people
of the United States a Government instituted by themselves for these essential
purposes.
Id. (quoting INAUGURAL ADDxsEsS OF TH PRusmENrs OF THE UNrrED STATES 2
(1989)) (hereinafter INAUGURAL ADDRESSES).
132. In his second inaugural address, President Jefferson acknowledged his need for
divine guidance in the following prayer:
I shall need, too, the favor of that Being in whose hands we are, who led our
fathers, as Israel of old, from their native land and planted them in a country
flowing with all the necessaries and comforts of life; who has covered our infancy
with His providence and our riper years with His wisdom and power, and to
whose goodness I ask you to join in supplications with me that He will so en-
lighten the minds of your servants, guide their councils, and prosper their meas-
ures that whatsoever they do shall result in your good, and shall secure to you the
peace, friendship, and approbation of all nations.
Id. at 2680 (quoting INAUGURAL ADDRESSES, supra note 131, at 22-23).
133. In James Madison's first inaugural address, he placed his confidence
in the guardianship and guidance of that Almighty Being whose power regulates
the destiny of nations, whose blessings have been so conspicuously dispensed to
this rising Republic, and to whom we are bound to address our devout gratitude
for the past, as well as our fervent supplications and best hopes for the future.
Id. (quoting INAUGURAL ADDRESSES, supra note 131, at 28).
134. President Bush, in his first official act as president, followed the tradition estab-
lished by George Washington and "asked those attending his inauguration to bow their
heads" as he said a prayer. Id. (citing INAUGURAL ADDRESSES, supra note 131, at 346).
135. Id. (citing Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 787 (1983) (applying historical analy-
sis, Court concludes that prayers during opening of legislative session do not violate the
Establishment Clause)).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 2679.
Justice Scalia completely rejected the notion that students at
graduation ceremonies are psychologically coerced to stand or main-
tain silence and he likened the majority's thinking to "psychology
practiced by amateurs."'138 Students are not "psychologically coerced
to bow their heads, place their hands in a ... prayer position, pay
attention to the prayers, utter 'Amen,' or in fact pray."'13 9 Justice
Scalia noted that in our society, standing is more often than not
viewed as simple respect for the views of others14° He stated sweep-
ingly that respect for the religious practices of others is essential to
any civilized society.'4 ' Moreover, the government's interest in pro-
moting respect for religion outweighs a non-believer's interest in
avoiding the guise of participation. 42
Justice Scalia further criticized the majority's contention that the
State "directed and controlled the content of the prayer."' 43 The prin-
cipal acted within his delegated authority, Justice Scalia claimed, when
he invited Rabbi Gutterman to deliver the invocation and benediction
at the graduation. Moreover, the pamphlet's purpose was simply to
give general advice on civic, nonsectarian prayers."4 School officials
did not write, revise, or censor the prayers. 45
Next, Justice Scalia looked at the meaning of coercion and the
type of coercion the Establishment Clause was adopted to prohibit.
This type, according to Justice Scalia, is coercion of "religious ortho-
doxy and of financial support by force of law and threat of penalty."'146
Justice Scalia felt that there was no evidence that Rabbi Gutterman's
nondenominational invocation and benediction violated the Constitu-
tion of the United States. 47 No one, Justice Scalia declared, was le-
gally coerced to recite these prayers. On the contrary, the prayers
were "so characteristically American they could have come from the
pen of George Washington or Abraham Lincoln himself."'1 48 Justice
Scalia further criticized the Court for relying on the school-prayer
138. Id. at 2681.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 2682.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 2683.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. To support his argument, Justice Scalia gave a brief description of the colony of
Virginia, where the Church of England was established. By law, ministers were obligated
to submit to the doctrine of the Church of England. All individuals had to attend church
and honor the Sabbath. In addition, they were required to support the Anglican ministers,
and to pay taxes for the costs of constructing and restoring churches. Id. (citing LEONARD
W. LEvy, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 4
(1986)).
147. Id. at 2684.
148. Id.
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caseS149 to support its arguments. 50 First, he noted, school instruction
is not tantamount to a public ceremony like a graduation.' 5' More-
over, mandatory attendance and the instructional setting distinguish
prayer in the classroom from the prayers at issue in Lee.'
52
Justice Scalia ended his dissent by commending the Court for ig-
noring the Lemon test 3 He considered this to be proof of the test's
irrelevance. 54 Nevertheless, he expressed his concern that the Court
had replaced Lemon with a "psycho-coercion test, which [has] no
roots whatever in our people's historic practice, and [is] as infinitely
expandable as the reasons for psychotherapy itself."'155
Finally, Justice Scalia wrote that despite Lee, invocations and
benedictions could still be given at future graduations with certain
safeguards. 56 Any constitutional defects, according to Justice Scalia,
could be cured if school officials made an oral or written announce-
ment, at the opening of the graduation ceremony, stating that individ-
uals are not forced to stand during the prayers and those who do stand
will not be assumed to have ratified the prayers. 57 This, Justice Scalia
suggested, would enable public schools to circumvent the Court's
decision.
M. Analysis
This Part will discuss three areas of the Lee opinion that are par-
ticularly weak and unpersuasive: 1) its reliance on the school-prayer
cases; 2) its likening of standing during prayer to overt compulsion in
prayer; and 3) its discussion of Marsh v. Chambers. Finally, this Part
will analyze Lee under the principles of the Lemon test. Although the
Lemon test has lost its popularity over the years, the Lee Court re-
fused to overrule it. Consequently, the test should have been used to
analyze the graduation prayers.
A. School-Prayer Cases
An initial difficulty with the Lee majority's analysis is its reliance
on the school-prayer cases, Engel v. Vitale'5 8 and Abington School
149. See, e.g., Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421 (1962).
150. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2684-85 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 2685.
152. Id. at 2684.





158. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
District v. Schempp,5 9 to support its coercion theory. The opinion
compared classroom prayers, found to violate the Establishment
Clause in Engel and Schempp, to prayers in the graduation context. 60
For several reasons, this comparison is not convincing.
Although the prayers in Engel violated the Establishment Clause
despite their voluntary nature and nondenominational tone, the Lee
Court overlooked some crucial differences. First, students recited the
prayers in Engel daily.16 1 Second, the prayers were recited in the
classroom.' 62 Third, the prayers were given to young children.'
63
Fourth, a teacher directed the prayers."6 Finally, the school officials
in Engel composed and recommended the prayer as part of their
"Statement on Moral and Spiritual Training in the Schools.'
' 6
Similarly, in Abington, the Bible readings occurred daily. 66
Moreover, the readings were broadcast into each classroom through
an intercommunications system under the supervision of a teacher. 67
As in Engel, the children involved were young. Given these factors,
the United States Supreme Court found the risk of coercion too great
to allow these practices to continue.
A graduation prayer takes place in a different environment. The
invocations and benedictions are recited only once a year. The cere-
mony is usually held at a secular location, such as an auditorium or
athletic facility.' 68 The ceremonies do not take place during school
hours, but after the school year has ended.' 69 Finally, because a
teacher typically does not deliver the prayers, there is less risk that
there will be coercion due to the authoritative teacher-student
relationship. 70
159. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
160. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2658 ("Our decisions in Engel v. Vitale and Abington School
District [v. Schempp], recognize, among other things, that prayer exercises in public
schools carry a particular risk of indirect coercion." Id. (citations omitted)).




165. Id. at 423.
166. Abington, 374 U.S. at 206.
167. Id. at 207.
168. In Providence, Rhode Island, high school students usually graduate off school
grounds, at Veterans Memorial Auditorium, which the Providence School Department
rents for the occasion. Middle school ceremonies usually take place at the schools them-
selves. Weisman v. Lee, 728 F. Supp. 68, 69 (D. R.I. 1990). See also Stein v. Plainwell
Comm. Sch., 822 F.2d 1406, 1408 (6th Cir. 1987).
169. Stein, 822 F.2d at 1415 (Wellford, Cir. J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 1409 (graduation context does not implicate the special nature of the
teacher-student relationship); Dawn N. Zammitti, An Establishment Clause Analysis of
Graduation Ceremony Invocations: Stein v. Plainwell Community Schools, 21 CoNN. L.
Rlv. 133, 156 (1988).
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Graduating seniors 7 1 are less affected by the coercive pressures
present in Engel and Abington. High school graduation in America
represents an individual's passage into young adulthood.172 Although
some students are still impressionable at this age, most have devel-
oped a maturity level and degree of understanding beyond that at-
tained by young elementary-age children such as those in Engel and
Abington. 73 In older students, there is less opportunity for religious
indoctrination and peer pressure. Overall, the heightened concerns of
protecting elementary and secondary students from the coercive pres-
sures present when prayers are delivered in the classroom are not
present in the graduation context.174
B. Overt Compulsion
The majority's analysis was also unpersuasive when it likened
standing or maintaining respectful silence during the graduation
prayers to compelled participation. The opinion insisted that the high
school graduation ceremony places both public and peer pressure on
students to stand.' 75 Moreover, when students do stand, they are "be-
ing forced by the State to pray in a manner [that their] conscience will
not allow .... -176
Students may feel some pressure to stand with their peers. Their
participation, however, is not necessarily a consequence of coercion.
Rather, standing or remaining silent could merely be an expression of
respect for the views of others, analogous to someone rising during a
standing ovation for a poor performance.
The majority concluded the coercion portion of its analysis by
stating that to allow the invocation and benediction would burden the
students by making them choose between joining the prayers or pro-
testing. 77 Interestingly, the majority explicitly refused to address
whether this burden would be present if the affected citizens were
171. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. Rhode Island's practice of inviting
members of the clergy to give invocations and benedictions applied to both public middle
and high schools. See Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2650. In the initial suirfor a temporary restraining
order, Deborah Weisman was a middle school student. At the time the permanent injunc-
tion was sought, however, Deborah was a high school student. Although the Court's pro-
hibition of graduation prayers applies to city public schools generally, and does not
distinguish between middle and high school students, the majority's analysis focused on
high school seniors. Consequently, Part III of this Comment focuses on the opinion's
troubling application of the coercion analysis to high school seniors.
172. See Zammitti, supra note 170, at 156 n.194.
173. Id. at 156.
174. See Stein, 822 F.2d at 1414-15 (Wellford, J., dissenting); Zammitti, supra note 170,
at 156-57.




"mature adults."178 As mentioned before, graduation signifies the
passage into young adulthood. As its holding extends to high school
graduations, 179 it is incongruous for the Supreme Court to find that
individuals entrusted with the rights and obligations of voting and mil-
itary service 8 0 are so susceptible to coercion that they are not worthy
of the label "mature adults."
The Court's protection of high school students from coercion in
Lee is different from the many protections that this country affords
our teenagers in other contexts. Statutory rape laws prohibiting sex-
ual relations between teenagers and adults protect teenagers from dis-
ease and unwanted pregnancies. 8 ' Similarly, minimum drinking-age
laws are meant to safeguard the health and safety of teenagers."S Ill-
advised sex and alcohol use are recognized as having harmful effects
on teenagers as well as adults. There is no evidence that a teenager
listening to a sixty-second prayer during a graduation ceremony will
suffer any grave or imminent danger.'83
C. Marsh v. Chambers
The majority opinion became most perplexing and strained when
it distinguished prayers delivered during a legislative invocation from
prayers delivered during a graduation."' The Court's treatment of
legislative prayers appears in Marsh v. Chambers.'85
In Marsh, a chaplain opened each session of the Nebraska legisla-
ture with a prayer. 86 The chaplain was compensated with public
funds and was selected every two years by the Executive Board of the
178. Id.
179. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
180. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 1478. See Michaelle S. DiGrazia, Comment, Sands v. Morongo
Unified School District: Graduates, Will We Stand And Join in Prayer?, 23 PAC. L. J. 1449,
1487 (1992).
181. In Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464 (1981), the
United States Supreme Court gave deference to California's statutory rape law, the pur-
pose of which is to prevent illegitimate teenage pregnancies and the significant harmful
and identifiable consequences of teenage pregnancies. Id. at 470-73.
182. Drinking age laws are generally enacted to enhance traffic safety. In Craig et al. v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), the United States Supreme Court acknowledged that the pro-
tection of public health and safety represent important state and local government func-
tions. The District Court in Craig concluded that the legislature's purpose in enacting the
Oklahoma drinking law was to "promote the safety of the young persons affected and the
public generally." Walker v. Hall, 399 F. Supp. 1304, 1311 n.6.
183. Any inherent harm present when people participate in a religious exercise that
they would not ordinarily attend would undoubtedly be de minimis. In addition, Marsh v.
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), indicated that such participation would be no real threat.
184. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2660-61.
185. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
186. Id. at 784. From 1965, until at least the time of the Marsh decision, a Presbyterian
minister had offered the prayers. Id. at 785.
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Legislative Council.18 7 The prayers were in the Judeo-Christian tradi-
tion.188 A tax-paying member of the Nebraska legislature brought an
action challenging the constitutionality of this practice. 1 89 The District
Court of Nebraska held that although the prayers did not violate the
Establishment Clause, the payment of the chaplain out of public funds
did. 9 ' The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found that both
the prayers and the chaplain's remuneration from public funds vio-
lated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.' 9 1 The
United States Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Burger,
reversed, finding that neither Nebraska's statute authorizing the prac-
tice of legislative prayers nor the payment of the chaplain out of pub-
lic funds violated the Establishment Clause.' 92
The Court in Marsh ignored the three-prong Lemon test, break-
ing away from established precedent. Instead, the Court relied on the
history of legislative prayer in this country to reach its decision. For
example, in 1774, the Continental Congress began the custom of pay-
ing a chaplain to open its sessions with a prayer. 193 Moreover, the
First Congress selected a chaplain to open the legislative sessions with
a prayer, just three days prior to the Congressional approval of the
language of the Bill of Rights.194 This, the Marsh Court felt, was clear
evidence that the drafters of the First Amendment's religion clauses
did not view such legislative chaplaincy programs as violative of that
amendment. 95
The majority's attempt in Lee to distinguish the holding in Marsh
was not very persuasive. First, the Lee opinion stated that the atmos-
phere of the opening session of a state legislature does not have the
constraining effects of a high school graduation because during a legis-
lative session "adults are free to enter and leave" as they wish. 9 6 Sec-
187. Id. at 784-85. In addition, the Legislature allowed itself to vote to collect and pub-
lish the prayers in prayerbooks at the public's expense. Id. at 785 n.1.
188. For example, on March 20, 1978, the chaplain gave the following invocation:
Father in heaven, the suffering and death of your son brought life to the whole
world moving our hearts to praise your glory. The power of the cross reveals your
concern for the world and the wonder of Christ crucified. The days of his life-
giving death and glorious resurrection are approaching. This is the hour when he
triumphed over Satan's pride; the time when we celebrate the great event of our
redemption.
Id. at 824 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting). After a 1980 complaint from a Jewish legislator, the
chaplain removed all references to Christ in his prayers. Id. at 793 n.14.
189. Id. at 785.
190. Id.
191. Chambers v. Marsh, 675 F.2d 228, 234-35 (8th Cir. 1982).
192. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793-96.
193. Id. at 787.
194. Id. at 788.
195. Id.
196. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2660.
ond, at a high school graduation, principals and teachers retain a
significant amount of control over the content of the program. In this
atmosphere, noted the Court, the "state-imposed character of an invo-
cation and benediction by clergy selected by the school combine to
make the prayer a state-sanctioned religious exercise in which the stu-
dent[s are] left with no alternative but to submit."' 97 The Court then
cited Engel v. Vitale and Abington School District v. Schempp as the
more applicable precedent.198
The first argument assumes that a graduation ceremony has the
constraining effects that the Court described. On the contrary, gradu-
ation exercises are festive, with family and friends of all ages in at-
tendance. The ceremonies often occur in large open areas with people
entering and leaving at different times. This atmosphere of celebra-
tion and amusement can hardly be characterized as constraining.
With respect to the second argument, the Court misread its own
opinion in Marsh. The Lee opinion based much of its argument on the
degree of control school officials have over the ceremony. 199 Having a
principal choose a clergy member to deliver the invocation and bene-
diction is not markedly different from having the Executive Board of
the Legislative Council choose the chaplain. It is strange that the
Court did not deem the legislature's selection of a chaplain to be con-
trolling. Indeed, in Marsh, the same minister delivered the legislative
prayer for sixteen years.
Not only did the State in Marsh control who delivered the legisla-
tive prayer, but it also controlled the content of the prayer.200 The
Court in Marsh explicitly stated that the content is not of concern to
judges when "there is no indication that the prayer opportunity has
been exploited to proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any
other, faith or belief."' 1 The Court implied, therefore, that it would
step in and prevent prayers that promote a particular faith. Likewise,
school officials controlled the content of the prayers in Lee when they
gave the rabbi a pamphlet explaining the types of prayers that would
be acceptable. Arguably, the rabbi could have ignored the pamphlet,
but this would be highly unlikely because as a religious figure, he
would not want to lose his respect in the community.
20 2
197. Id. at 2660-61.
198. Id. at 2661.
199. Id. at 2655-60.
200. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794-95. In Marsh, Reverend Palmer eliminated the Christian
references in his prayers in response to the complaints of some state senators. Id. at 820
n.44 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Thus, these state senators indirectly controlled the content
of the reverend's program by their complaints, just as the secular guidelines controlled the
content of the prayer in Lee.
201. I.
202. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2656.
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A deeper flaw in the Lee majority's reasoning was its characteri-
zation of a graduation prayer as a state-sanctioned religious exercise,
having refused to characterize a legislative prayer as such in Marsh."3
To treat invocations for judges, legislators, and public officials differ-
ently than invocations for graduating students is inconsistent. The ap-
pearance of state sponsorship of religion is seemingly greater for
prayers in a legislative session than prayers in an individual school. A
legislative prayer is more likely to be viewed by the public as linking
religious belief to the state than a high school graduation prayer.2
Even if this were not true, and the public viewed both prayers as
equivalent establishments of religion, Lee and Marsh should have
reached the same conclusion.
The Lee majority's argument that the coercive pressures present
in a graduation context are not applicable to legislators is met by Jus-
tice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Marsh: "Legislators, by virtue of
their instinct for political survival, are often loath to assert in public
religious views that their constituents might perceive as hostile or non-
conforming. "205 Given that the Court believed there to be coercive
pressures in the graduation prayer context, it would have been more
consistent for the Court to overrule Marsh than to distinguish it in an
unconvincing manner.
In sum, the majority's analysis in Lee is logically unsound and
unpersuasive. Its reliance on the school-prayer cases, its coercion ar-
gument, and its attempt to distinguish Marsh are unsupported by legal
precedent. Despite the weak reasoning in Lee, however, there are
persuasive reasons to conclude that the Court reached an appropriate
result under Lemon.
D. Lemon v. Kurtzman Analysis
Although several members of the Court have criticized the
Lemon test,206 the Court has never explicitly overruled Lemon." 7 In
Lee, the Court decided the case without invoking the principles of
203. Id. at 2660-61.
204. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 798 (Brennan, J., concurring).
205. Id. at 798 n.5.
206. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655-56 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S.
578 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 426-30 (1985)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 110-13 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); Roemer v. Maryland Pub. Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736, 768-69 (1976) (White, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
207. In a recent case, Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993), the
Court decided an Establishment Clause case without following the Lemon test, but did not
overrule the test. See infra notes 267-74 and accompanying text.
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Lemon. However, as evidenced by Justice Blackmun's concurrence in
Lee, Lemon has not yet been permanently abandoned.
In his concurrence, Justice Blackmun analyzed the constitutional-
ity of public school graduation prayers under Lemon.2 °8 Moreover, in
a footnote, Justice Blackmun reminded the Court that since 1971,
Marsh v. Chambers was the only Establishment Clause case out of
thirty-one that the Court decided without invoking the Lemon test.
20 9
Prior to Lee, all cases involving religious activities in public schools
applied the Lemon test.210
In adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis, the Court should
have relied on Lemon's principles to support its decision in Lee. Ap-
plying the Lemon factors to the facts of Lee would have given the
Court's holding a more solid foundation.211 Although there is no vio-
lation of the secular purpose prong of Lemon, the public school grad-
uation prayers fail both the effect and entanglement prongs.
1. Secular Purpose
Graduation prayers pass the secular purpose prong of the Lemon
test for several reasons. Lemon does not mandate that the govern-
ment activity have an exclusively secular purpose. Lemon only re-
quires that there be at least one secular purpose.212 As such, Rabbi
Gutterman's prayer should be viewed in the context of the entire
graduation ceremony. While carrying a religious tone, the prayer was
brief and was delivered in the larger context of recognizing and honor-
ing the graduates for their achievements. Furthermore, the prayer
served to solemnize the public occasion, thank the teachers and ad-
ministrators for their efforts, and express hope for posterity.213 Thus,
the purpose of the prayer was not merely to advance religion.214
208. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
209. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2663 n.4 (Blackmun, J., concurring). After Lee, the Court in
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist. 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993), held that the government
does not violate the Establishment Clause when it provides a deaf student an interpreter at
a Roman Catholic high school. The Court did not mention the Lemon case at all, but did
not overrule it either. Id. See infra notes 267-74 and accompanying text.
210. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2663-64 n.4.
211. In order for a statute or activity to pass the Lemon test, 1) it "must have a secular
legislative purpose"; 2) "its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances
nor inhibits religion"; and 3) "the statute must not foster 'an excessive entanglement with
religion."' Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13. See supra notes 21-28 and accompa-
nying text.
212. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 681 n.6 (1984).
213. See id. at 693 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
214. See, e.g., id. at 671, 685. In Lynch, the Court upheld the display of a cr6eche as part
of a city's Christmas display. The cr6che was only part of the larger display, which included
reindeer pulling Santa's sleigh, candy-striped poles, a Christmas tree, carolers, cutout
clown and animal figures, colored lights, and a large banner with the words "SEASONS
GREETINGS." Id. Compare County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989), where
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2. Primary Effect
Unlike the primary purpose prong of Lemon, an analysis under
the primary effect prong reveals some constitutional problems. The
graduation prayer in Lee does have the primary effect of identifying
the State with religion. The prayers "advance religion by creating an
identification of school with a deity, and therefore [with a] reli-
gion.12 1 - Moreover, graduation is a unique and special occasion in the
lives of many. The union of prayer, school, and an important occasion
identifies religion with a public school function. 16
An analysis under Justice O'Connor's endorsement test,2 17 which
is closely related to the effect prong of Lemon, also suggests that the
graduation prayer is unconstitutional. By authorizing an appeal to a
deity during the public school graduation ceremony, the Providence
School District conveys the message that government prefers religion
over nonreligion. This is endorsing religion. This "[e]ndorsement
sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full
members of the political community, and an accompanying message
to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political
community.
'218
Supporters of graduation prayers might argue that the prayers are
a mere "ceremonial deism."2 9 For example, the phrase "In God We
Trust" has been printed on United States coins and currency since the
Civil War."2 Although it identifies the state with a deity, and there-
fore a religion, it does not violate the Constitution. Other examples of
"ceremonial deism" include the opening of court sessions with "God
save the United States and this Honorable Court" and the reciting of
the words "One Nation Under God" as part of the Pledge of Alle-
giance.22' These features of public life are distinguishable from gradu-
ation prayers. Mottos, with fixed wordings, do not present as great a
risk of creating the appearance that government is approving a partic-
ular religious belief or practice. Although the expressions use the
the Court held that a creche placed on the Grand Staircase of the Allegheny County
Courthouse surrounded by some trees, a fence, and poinsettias violated the Establishment
Clause. No other Christmas figures, such as Santa Claus or reindeer, appeared on the
Grand Staircase. Id. at 598-602.
215. See Weisman v. Lee, 728 F. Supp. 68, 72 (D. R.I. 1990).
216. Id. at 72-73.
217. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
218. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
219. This language was used by Justice Brennan in his dissenting opinion in Lynch, 465
U.S. at 716.
220. Sands v. Morongo Unified Sch. Dist., 809 P.2d 809, 826 (Cal. 1991) (Lucas, CJ.,
concurring).
221. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 716 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S.
783, 818 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
303-04 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring); Sands, 809 P.2d at 826 (Lucas, C.J., concurring).
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term "God," they do not violate the Establishment Clause because
their constant use, in secular settings, has stripped them of any reli-
gious meaning.z 2
By contrast, the mention of a deity during a prayer invokes an
entirely different message. That the prayer may contemplate some
wholly secular objective cannot alter the inherently religious character
of the exercise. According to one federal appellate court,
Prayer is perhaps the quintessential religious practice for many
of the world's faiths... [prayer] is an address of entreaty, sup-
plication, praise, or thanksgiving directed toward some sacred or
divine spirit, being or object.'
Similarly, the United States Supreme Court has recognized the signifi-
cance of prayer on more than one occasion. In Engel v. Vitale,224 the
Court characterized prayer as "a solemn avowal of divine faith and
supplication for the blessings of the Almighty" and emphasized the
inherently religious nature of prayers. More recently, the Lee major-
ity stated that it would offend Rabbi Gutterman to characterize his
prayers as void of any religious meaning.2 -5
3. Entanglement
Although the violation of the effect prong of Lemon is alone suf-
ficient to invalidate the practice of having prayers at a graduation cer-
emony,22 6 an entanglement prong analysis strengthens the Lee
holding. The purpose of the excessive entanglement prong is to keep
the state from becoming too "involved with the determination of reli-
gious practice. ' 2 7 Specifically, this part of the test is meant to keep
the state from unlawfully policing religious affairs.228 Allowing
prayers at a public school graduation entangles government and reli-
gion in at least two ways: the government appoints the religious
speaker and the prayer's content must conform to government
standards. 229
In Lee, entanglement was present when the principal of Nathan
Bishop Middle School selected Rabbi Gutterman to deliver the invo-
cation and benediction.1 0 Allowing school officials to choose reli-
222. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 716 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
223. Weisman v. Lee, 908 F.2d 1090, 1097 (1st Cir. 1990) (citing Karen B. v. Treen, 653
F.2d 897, 901 (5th Cir. 1981), aff'd, 455 U.S. 913 (1982)).
224. 370 U.S. 421, 424-25 (1962).
225. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2659.
226. If the challenged governmental action fails to satisfy any one of the three prongs of
the Lemon test, the Establishment Clause is violated. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578,
582-83 (1987).
227. Weisman v. Lee, 908 F.2d 1090, 1095 (1st Cir. 1990).
228. Id.
229. Sands v. Morongo Unified Sch. Dist., 809 P.2d 809, 818 (Cal. 1991).
230. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2655.
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gious speakers causes excessive entanglement because the officials
tend to appoint speakers that represent their own religious beliefs, or
the beliefs of the majority of the community." 1 Entanglement was
similarly present when the principal issued guidelines and told the
rabbi to keep the prayers nonsectarian.3 2 Moreover, litigation in this
sensitive area would force the courts to evaluate the religious content
of speech.23 3 This could eventually result in the unconstitutional de-
velopment of judicial standards governing what constitutes a proper
public prayer. 3 4
Under the Lemon test, the Lee Court's invalidation of the gradu-
ation prayer would have rested on a more solid foundation. Cases
that have followed Lee reflect the continuing confusion over gradua-
tion prayers and the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence in
general.
E. Subsequent Cases
1. Jones v. Clear Creek Independent School District
At least one court has been faced with the constitutionality of
public school graduation prayers since Lee. Jones v. Clear Creek In-
dependent School District"35 tested the constitutionality of student-or-
ganized prayer.
In 1986, the Clear Lake High School graduation invocation in-
cluded references to the Christian faith.3 6 Following this invocation,
two Clear Lake students and their fathers complained that the school
district's policy of permitting invocations that consisted primarily of
Christian prayer violated the Establishment Clause.3 7 They sought to
enjoin the district from allowing invocations and benedictions at pub-
lic high school graduations.3 8 In response to the litigation, the school
district adopted a resolution239 that provided the following new
guidelines:
1. The use of an invocation and/or benediction at high school
graduation exercise shall rest within the discretion of the gradu-
ating senior class, with the advice and counsel of the senior class
principal; 2. [t]he invocation and benediction, if used, shall be
231. Sands, 809 P.2d at 818.
232. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2656.
233. Sands, 809 P.2d at 818. See also Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 410-11 (1985).
234. Weisman v. Lee, 728 F. Supp. 68, 74 (D. R.I. 1990).
235. 930 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1991).
236. Id. at 417. Specifically, the 1986 graduation ceremony contained the phrases
"Lord," "Gospel," "Amen," and referred to God's omnipotence. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. The resolution was adopted just three weeks before the Jones case was to go to
trial. Id.
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given by a student volunteer; and 3. [c]onsistent with the princi-
ple of equal liberty of conscience, the invocation and benedic-
tion shall be nonsectarian and nonproselytizing in nature.2'
The district court applied the three-part Lemon test and held that in-
vocations conforming with the district's resolution did not violate the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment." 1
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision
of the district court.242 The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and
remanded, however, for further consideration in light of Lee v.
Weisman.243
On remand, the Fifth Circuit again affirmed the district court's
decision in the school's favor, holding that the decision in Lee did not
render student-organized prayer unconstitutional.244 Recognizing the
confusion that resulted from the coercion analysis in Lee, the Fifth
Circuit took an innovative approach to analyzing the case. From
Lemon to Lee, the court noted, the Supreme Court has used five dif-
ferent tests to assess whether a public school's religious activities of-
fend the Establishment Clause.' 5 Consequently, the court decided to
use all five tests to analyze the graduation prayer resolution.246 Under
each test, the court found the resolution constitutional.247
First, the court established that the resolution's purpose and ef-
fect were to solemnize the graduation ceremonies, and not to "ad-
vance religion."2 4' Therefore, it passed the secular purpose and
primary effect tests. Second, the court held that the resolution passed
the entanglement test because a public institution was not involved. 249
Where in Lee, a rabbi wrote and delivered the prayer, in Jones, the
resolution authorized students to write and deliver the prayer. Third,
the court held that the policy of allowing student-organized prayer
does not endorse religion because "a graduating high school senior
who participates in the decision as to whether her graduation will in-
clude an invocation by a fellow student volunteer will understand that
240. Id.
241. Id. at 418.
242. Id at 416.
243. 112 S. Ct. 3020 (1992).
244. Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963, 965 (5th Cir. 1992).
245. Id. at 966. The five tests are as follows: 1) the secular purpose test; 2) the primary
effect test; 3) the entanglement test; 4) the endorsement test; and 5) the coercion test. See
id. at 966-69. The first three tests are taken from the Supreme Court's decision in Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). The fourth test was introduced by Justice O'Connor
in her concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly, 403 U.S. 668, 688 (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring). Finally, the coercion test surfaced for the first time in Lee. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2655.
246. Jones, 977 F.2d at 966.
247. Id at 966-70.
248. Id. at 967.
249. Id. at 968.
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any religious references are the result of student, not government,
choice."' 2 0 Finally, the court identified unconstitutional coercion as
when "(1) the government directs (2) a formal religious exercise (3) in
such a way as to oblige the participation of objectors."5 1 The court
found that none of these elements of unconstitutional coercion were
present, thereby allowing the resolution to pass the fifth and final
test. 22 The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.
253
2. Lamb's Chapel and Zobrest
Although the United States Supreme Court refused to review the
decision in Jones, the Court has recently decided two Establishment
Clause cases: Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches School DistrictO 5 4 and
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District.55 Unlike Lee and Jones,
Lamb's Chapel and Zobrest did not address the constitutionality of
prayers in public schools. Nevertheless, a brief examination of these
cases is helpful in evaluating current Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence and the status of the Lemon test.
Lamb's Chapel involved .a New York law giving school boards
permission to regulate the use of school property after school hours.
Pursuant to this law, the Center Moriches Union Free School District
issued a rule stating that "'[tihe school premises shall not be used by
any group for religious purposes.""' Accordingly, the district re-
jected Pastor John Steigerwald's application for permission to use the
school facilities. Steigerwald wanted to show a six-part film series fo-
cusing on how the media undermines society and how returning to
traditional Christian family values could counterbalance the media's
effects.25
7
The Court held that denying Steigerwald the opportunity to show
his film series was an unconstitutional application of the district's rule.
It is true that the rule did not discriminate among religions. However,
because the school property could only be used to present issues on
family values that did not'relate to religion, the district impermissibly
discriminated on the basis of viewpoint."5
Having held that denying Steigerwald the chance to present his
film series violated his First Amendment right to free speech, the
Court went on to analyze whether allowing the film series would vio-
250. Id. at 969 (emphasis omitted).
251. Id. at 970.
252. Id.
253. Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. School Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2950 (1993).
254. 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993).
255. 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993).
256. Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2144 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. 57a).
257. Id.
258. Id. at 2146-48.
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late the Establishment Clause.5 9 The Court began its analysis with
an application of what appeared to be Justice O'Connor's endorse-
ment test.
The showing of this film would not have been during school
hours, would not have been sponsored by the school, and would
have been open to the public, not just to Church members....
Under these circumstances,... there would have been no realis-
tic danger that the community would think that the District was
endorsing religion .... 260
Although this analysis was sufficient to support the Court's view, Jus-
tice White's majority opinion surprisingly261 invoked the Lemon test.
In one sentence, the Court stated that the challenged action "[had] a
secular purpose, [did] not have the principal or primary effect of ad-
vancing or inhibiting religion, and [did] not foster an excessive entan-
glement with religion.
'262
In Justice Scalia's humorous concurrence, 263 he strongly criticized
the majority for invoking Lemon.26 He then expressed some admira-
tion for the constitutional scholars who disfavor Lemon.265 As a sub-
stitute to Lemon, Justice Scalia seemed to advocate a new test. In
short, he stated that allowing Steigerwald to show his film series did
not offend the Establishment Clause because "it [did] not signify state
or local embrace of a particular religious sect.''26
6
259. See id. at 2148 (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 271 (1981)) (state's interest
"in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation 'may be [a] compelling' one justifying an
abridgment of free speech otherwise protected by the First Amendment.").
260. Id.
261. Justice White, has, on several occasions, expressed his dissatisfaction with Estab-
lishment Clause precedent, namely, the Lemon test. See e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S.
38, 90-91 (1985) (White, J., dissenting); Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 400 (1985)
(White, J., dissenting); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 282 (1981) (White, J., dissenting).
262. Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2148.
263. A portion of Justice Scalia's opinion reads as follows:
As to the Court's invocation of the Lemon test: Like some ghoul in a late-night
horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being
repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence once again, frightening the little children and school attorneys of Center
Moriches Union Free School District. Its most recent burial, only last Term, was,
to be sure, not fully six-feet under: our decision in Lee v. Weisman conspicuously
avoided using the supposed 'test' but also declined the invitation to repudiate
it.... The secret of the Lemon test's survival, I think, is that it is so easy to kill. It
is there to scare us (and our audience) when we wish it to do so, but we can
command it to return to the tomb at will.
Id. 2149-50 (citations omitted) (Scalia, J., concurring).
264. Id.
265. Id. at 2150 (citing Jesse H. Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial
Schools-An Update, 75 CAL. L. Rnv. 5, 13-14 (1987); William P. Marshall, "We Know It
When We See It": The Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 495, 497-98
(1986)).
266. Id. at 2151.
W'mter 1994] LEE v. WEISMAN
472 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 21:441
The Court's reference to Lemon in Lamb's Chapel has, once
again, perpetuated Establishment Clause confusion. Although Lemon
may not be the best test to apply, as long as the Court refuses to over-
rule it, lower courts must treat it as though it has some merit.
Eleven days after Lamb's Chapel was decided, the United States
Supreme Court decided Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Dis-
trict.267 In Zobrest, a school district refused to provide a deaf child
with a sign-language interpreter while he attended Roman Catholic
school. The District Court of Arizona granted the school district's
summary judgment motion on Establishment Clause grounds, stating
that "[t]he interpreter would act as a conduit for the religious inculca-
tion of James-thereby, promoting James' religious development at
government expense. 2 68 The Court of Appeals affirmed, relying
completely on Lemon.269 The court held that the primary effect
prong, but not the primary purpose prong, was violated. "By placing
its employee in the sectarian school, the government would create the
appearance that it was a 'joint sponsor' of the school's activities."270
In an opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the United
States Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals,
holding that providing a deaf student enrolled in a religious school
with an interpreter pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Edu-
cation Act does not offend the Establishment Clause.2 71 Despite the
doctrine of stare decisis, the Court completely ignored the Lemon
test. Instead, the Court relied on principles of neutrality to reach its
decision. Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that "[w]hen the government
offers a neutral service on the premises of a sectarian school as part of
a general program that 'is in no way skewed towards religion,' it fol-
lows under our prior decisions that provision of that service does not
offend the Establishment Clause."272 The interpreter service, accord-
ing to Chief Justice Rehnquist, was part of a general government pro-
gram that gave benefits to qualified children, without considering the
types of schools the children attended. 73 As such, the aid flowed to
the children, not the schools.2 74 Unfortunately, while lower courts are
still applying Lemon, the Supreme Court has not, with any of these
new cases, clarified the status of the Lemon test.
267. 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993).
268. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., No. CIV-88-516 (D. Ariz. Oct. 19, 1989).
269. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 1190, 1193-96 (9th Cir. 1992).
270. Id. at 1194-95.
271. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2467-69.
272. Id. at 2467 (quoting Witters v. Washington Dept. of Serv. for the Blind, 474 U.S.
481, 488 (1986)).
273. Id.
274. Id. at 2469.
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IV. Options after Lee v. Weisman
Religion plays an important role in the lives of many of our coun-
try's citizens. The United States Supreme Court realizes that "[w]e
are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Be-
ing., 275 Nonetheless, the Court often must make difficult decisions.
The Court does not necessarily reach these decisions because they
represent the popular view, but "because they are right, right in the
sense that the law and the Constitution ... compel the result."276
Prayer often provides people with hope and guidance, and it seems
that there should be some viable alternatives to allow its public
expression.
One alternative is a secular message delivered by a religious
leader. Nothing in the United States Constitution "prevents a cleric
of any denomination or anyone else from giving a secular inspirational
message at the opening and closing of the graduation ceremonies.
'277
As Judge Boyle of the District Court of Rhode Island pointed out, the
following benediction could have been delivered at Deborah's
graduation:
For the legacy of America where diversity is celebrated and the
rights of minorities are protected, we are thankful. May these
young men and women grow up to enrich it. For the liberty of
America, we are thankful. May these new graduates grow up to
guard it. For the political process of America in which citizens
may participate, for its court system where all can seek justice
we are thankful. May those we honor this morning always turn
to it in trust. For the destiny of America we are thankful. May
the graduates of Nathan Bishop Middle School so live that they
may help to share it. May our aspirations for our country and
for these young people, who are our hope for the future, be
richly fulfilled.o a
A secular, but inspiring message of this sort would uplift those present
without government endorsement or disapproval of religion.27 9
275. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
276. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420-21 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
277. Weisman v. Lee, 728 F. Supp. 68, 74 (D. R.I. 1990).
278. Id. at 74-75 n.10.
279. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 693 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). One
judge has argued that manipulating a message so as not to invoke a deity does not solve the
constitutional problem. Judge Bownes of the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit does not believe that the direct reference to a deity should be the guiding factor in
the constitutional analysis. Weisman v. Lee, 908 F.2d 1090, 1097 (1st. Cir. 1990). Implic-
itly, Judge Bownes defines prayer as any statement by a religious official, regardless of
whether the name of God is mentioned or specific references to religious beliefs or prac-
tices are made. This is simply too broad a definition, which would likely invade the reli-
gious official's freedom of speech. Expressing thanks for some of this country's greatest
assets (e.g., diversity and the rights of minorities) is not necessarily religious expression.
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As another alternative, a moment of silence during the gradua-
tion ceremony would allow students and those attending to meditate,
pray, or reflect on their achievements and activities throughout the
school year. 80 A large number of states "permit or require public
school teachers to have students observe a moment of silence in their
classrooms."'" There are inherent differences between a state-spon-
sored moment of silence in the public schools and state-sponsored vo-
cal prayers282 or Bible readings. 83 First, unlike prayers or Bible
readings, silence is neither religious by nature nor intrinsically related
to religious activities.2s4 Second, during a moment of silence, nonbe-
lievers need not concede their beliefs.285 Students who do not wish to
pray may be left to their own thoughts and do not have to listen to the
thoughts or prayers of anyone else. Since moment-of-silence statutes
have been widely accepted, even in the relatively coercive environ-
ment of the classroom,28 6 there does not appear to be any significant
constitutional problem with having a moment of silence during a grad-
uation commencement.
A further alternative is student-organized prayer at graduation.'
In Jones, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals made it clear that student-
organized prayer would remain lawful in at least three states: Texas,
Mississippi, and Louisiana 8.2 8 Nonetheless, the Jones decision is ques-
tionable. Lee emphasized the general principle that the state should
not be involved in school prayers.289 This involvement could occur
whether a rabbi or student delivers the prayer. The school district's
resolution in Jones granted school officials permission to advise and
280. In Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985), the Supreme Court held that an in-class
moment-of-silence statute violated the Establishment Clause, though this should not be
interpreted to mean that voluntary silent prayer under all circumstances is unconstitu-
tional. See id. at 74. (O'Connor, J., concurring). According to Justice O'Connor, however,
the federal trial courts are split on the constitutionality of moment-of-silence laws. Id. at
71.
281. Id. at 70-71.
282. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
283. See, e.g., Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
284. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 72 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
285. Id.
286. See Abington, 374 U.S. at 281 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[A] moment of reverent
silence at the opening of class may [serve] the solely secular purposes of the devotional
activities without jeopardizing either the religious liberties of any members of the commu-
nity or the proper degree of separation between the spheres of religion and government.")
Id. See also P. FREUND, THE LEGAL ISSUE, IN RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 23
(1965); Jesse H. Choper, Religion in the Public Schools: A Proposed Constitutional Stan-
dard, 47 MINN. L. REv. 329, 371 (1963); Paul G. Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools, and the
Supreme Court, 61 MICH. L. REv. 1031, 1041 (1963).
287. See supra notes 235-53 and accompanying text.
288. Henry J. Reske, Graduation Prayers, Part II, A.B.A. J., July 1993, at 14, 14.
289. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2665.
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counsel seniors regarding whether to include a prayer in the gradua-
tion ceremony. Unfortunately, this leaves the officials ample room to
exploit the students. Moreover, because the prayer must be nonsec-
tarian and nonproselytizing, a school official would undoubtedly have
to review the prayer before it is given. Like the situation in Lee, the
state will necessarily become involved in the prayer.
That notwithstanding, because certiorari in Jones was denied,2'
student-organized prayer appears to be a viable option in the near
future, no matter how constitutionally suspect the option may be.291
Justice Scalia has suggested another option, saying that public
schools can easily circumvent the Lee decision. 2 2 According to Jus-
tice Scalia, if school officials warn the audience at the beginning of the
ceremony that the graduates are not forced to join the prayers and
will not be assumed to have joined by rising, the prayers would not
violate the Establishment Clause.293 It seems unlikely, however, that
such a solution would pass constitutional muster. The Court is not
concerned with who has joined the prayers. The Court in Lee op-
posed school officials directing and controlling school prayers, and
government endorsing religion.294
One final option is prayers sponsored by private individuals
outside of the school context. Nothing in the Constitution prohibits
private parties from organizing baccalaureate or other ceremonies to
remember and worship God. The entire senior class could attend such
290. See supra note 253.
291. At least one organization has protested the Jones decision. The ACLU maintains
that student-organized prayers under Jones are unconstitutional. Henry J. Reske, Gradua-
tion Prayers, Part II, A.B.A. J., July 1993, at 14, 16. Particularly troubling, according to the
ACLU, is that students vote for the prayers, and school officials are required to schedule
and approve the prayers. Id. As Robert S. Peck, legislative counsel for the ACLU, has
stated, "Constitutional rights would be meaningless if they could be overruled by a vote. It
is important to understand that when we prohibit government from taking sides in a reli-
gious dispute, we are protecting religion from government control." Id. Nonetheless, the
ACLU has apparently adopted the position that students may organize private prayers
before and after the officially scheduled graduation time. However, to pass constitutional
muster, such prayers would have to be "voluntary, held off of school grounds, and organ-
ized without participation by school officials." Id. In addition, Peck finds no constitutional
violation if a student valedictorian injects a prayer into her speech, as long as the prayer
was not pre-approved by school officials. Id. Pat Robertson, of the American Center for
Law and Justice, has threatened to sue school boards, that prevent student-organized
prayers. Id. at 14. In response, Gwendolyn Gregory, deputy general counsel for the Na-
tional School Boards Association (NSBA), has stated that the ACLU will file suit if stu-
dents agree to lead a Jones-type prayer. Id.
292. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2685.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 2655. The Court in Lee referred to the State's involvement in school prayers
as troubling. Id. (emphasis added).
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an event, as long as school officials do not involve themselves in its
organization and content.295
Conclusion
For the first time, the Court has ruled on the constitutionality of
state-sponsored graduation prayers. In Lee, the Court invented a co-
ercion test to support its holding that Rabbi Gutterman's high school
graduation prayer violated the essential principles of the Establish-
ment Clause.
Unfortunately, the Court's analysis was weak. TWo especially
troubling areas were the Court's reliance on the school-prayer cases
and the Court's likening of standing during the prayer to overt com-
pulsion. Moreover, no clear rationale or precedent supported the
Court in its attempt to distinguish the legislative prayers approved in
Marsh from the graduation prayers in Lee. Finally, because the Court
did not overrule Lemon, it should have relied on Lemon to give its
decision a more solid foundation.
The decision in Lee left the law in a state of confusion. Lower
courts continue to have a hard time deciding whether to apply Lee,
Marsh, or Lemon in deciding an Establishment Clause challenge to
state-sponsored prayers. It is difficult to predict how the Court will
treat public prayers in contexts other than graduations or legislative
sessions. For example, in a ceremony for the opening of a public chil-
dren's hospital, would the prayers offered fall under the Marsh hold-
ing or the Lee holding? Would the Court hold that the history of
prayers in public ceremonies is enough to validate the prayers? Or
would the Court recognize that children will be attending and apply
the majority's psychological coercion standard? Unfortunately, the
Court has left many open questions in the wake of Lee, and the Es-
tablishment Clause cases since Lee have not been successful in clear-
ing up any of the confusion.
295. In his concurring opinion in Lee, Justice Souter has also suggested that the Estab-
lishment Clause would not prohibit individuals from organizing a privately sponsored bac-
calaureate. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
